[2022-01-03]Reddit军事板块话题：中国人为什么能在朝鲜战争中表现得如此出色？

Nodeo-Franvier
Even with the Soviet airforce denying UN air superiority and the general neglect in US military,How was the Chinese able to perform so well against UN force made up mostly of Western Allies?

（题主）即使苏联空军否认联合国的空中优势，美国军队也普遍忽视，但是在对抗主要由西方盟国组成的联合国部队，中国人为何能够表现得如此出色？

MaterialCarrot
Some thoughts that come to mind:
Numbers of course. The Chinese attacked US/UN forces with tremendous strength of numbers. According to the Chinese, at peak strength they had about 1.5 million men in Korea. Peak strength for the US was 330,000. In 4 years of combat 35,000 Americans died in Korea. In the less than two years of combat that China was involved they, according to the Chinese government, sustained over 180,000 deaths, with speculation that the number could be much higher.
Other than material and logistical inferiority, the Chinese army fought very well and were generally well led. Chinese soldiers were largely very motivated and able to withstand much privation, and were excellent at infiltration and close infantry combat.
Allied overconfidence. The US (MacArthur in particular) ignored clear indications that the Chinese were going to intervene. This hubris resulted in US/SK/Allied forces being caught off balance when the Chinese attacked. Much of the second half of the Korean War was the Allies recovering from being knocked off balance.
Logistics. Despite what I said about Chinese logistics problems (and they definitely had them), the Korean War was fought right next to China, whereas outside of SK, the US and most of its allies were fighting at the end of a several thousand mile long logistics chain. The US had and used very effectively it's massive firepower advantage, but in no reality could the US put millions of US troops in Korea the way the Chinese could walk them in.
Political motivation. Related to the point above, China viewed the Korean War as directly related to its interests, perhaps even an existential threat. The US and Allied reasons for being there were much more tenuous. Even if the US could have put a million soldiers in Korea as I wrote above, there's no way in hell the American public would have supported it. The US Administration was under constant domestic political pressure to keep US involvement in the Korean War limited, and that's what they did. This was a war that in the US largely nobody wanted. There's a reason it to this day it is referred to as "The Forgotten War."
In Mortal Combat: Korea, by Tolland is a great overview of the war. On Desperate Ground, by Sides is an excellent and riveting history of the US fighting China at the Chosin Reservoir.

我脑海中浮现了一些想法：
当然是数量。中国人以巨大的兵力攻击美国/联合国军队。根据中国人的说法，他们在朝鲜高峰期的时候有大约150万人。而美国的最高兵力为33万人。在4年的战斗中，35000名美国人死在了朝鲜。根据中国的统计，在参与不到两年的战斗中，他们死亡人数超过了18万，人们猜测这个数字可能会更高。
除了物资和后勤方面的劣势之外，中国军队打得很好，总体来说领导得很好。中国士兵在很大程度上积极性很高，能够承受大部分的困难，并且在渗透和近距离步兵作战方面非常出色。
盟军的过度自信。美国(尤其是麦克阿瑟)忽视了中国准备进行干预的明确迹象。这种傲慢导致美国/韩国/盟军在中国进攻时失去平衡。朝鲜战争后半期的大部分时间是盟军从被打乱的平衡中恢复过来。
后勤。尽管我说过中国的后勤问题(他们肯定存在这些问题)，但朝鲜战争就在中国旁边打，而在韩国之外，美国及其大多数盟友都在几千英里长的后勤链的末端打。美国曾非常有效地利用了它的强大火力优势，但在现实中，美国绝不可能像中国那样向朝鲜派遣数百万美军。
政治动机。与上述观点相关的是，中国认为朝鲜战争与其利益直接相关，甚至可能是一种生存威胁。美国和盟军在那里的理由要薄弱许多。即使美国可以像我上面说的那样在韩国部署百万士兵，美国公众也绝对不会支持的。美国政府不断受到国内政治压力，要求限制美国参与朝鲜战争，他们就是这么做的。这是一场在美国基本上没有人想要的战争。这场战争至今仍被称为“被遗忘的战争”是有原因的。
在《殊死搏斗：朝鲜战争》一书中，托兰对这场战争进行了精彩的概述。《绝望之地》讲述了美国在长津湖与中国作战的精彩而引人入胜的历史。

Emperor-Commodus -> MaterialCarrot
How would you rank The Coldest Winter by David Halberstam? I read it a long time ago and was thinking about re-reading. IIRC he puts much of the blame on MacArthur for having a terrible intelligence corps and ignoring political realities in favor of constantly being on the offensive.

你如何评价大卫-哈尔伯斯塔姆的《最寒冷的冬天》？我很久以前读过这本书，现在正考虑重读。我记得他把大部分责任归咎于麦克阿瑟，因为他有一个糟糕的情报团，无视政治现实，只顾着不断发动进攻。

MaterialCarrot -> Emperor-Commodus
Have not read it, but I know it's well regarded. Yes, what I have read on balance lays a lot of blame on MacArthur for being caught so flat footed.
Since you've read a general history book about Korea, I'd recommend On Desperate Ground. It's just about the Chosin Reservoir battles, but really puts you in the minds and bodies of the guys fighting it, as well as putting the battle in a greater strategic context. Fascinating stuff.

我没有读过，但我知道它很受好评。是的，总的来说，我读到的很多内容都指责麦克阿瑟被搞得措手不及。
既然你已经读过了关于朝鲜的通史书，我推荐《绝望之地》。它只是关于长津湖的战役，但真正让你进入士兵的思想和身体，以及把战斗放在一个更大的战略背景下。令人着迷。

pokefisk -> MaterialCarrot
I've seen many people mention the first book, but I'll read both. Just wonder which one should I start first?
Should I get wider picture first?

我看到很多人提到第一本书，但我两本都会读。只是不知道应该先从哪一本开始？
我是不是应该先了解一下更广阔的背景？

MaterialCarrot -> pokefisk
Personally, I would start broad with the general overview, then read about Chosin Reservoir after that.

就我个人而言，我会从总体概述开始，然后阅读有关长津湖的文章。

pokefisk -> MaterialCarrot
Thank you, I have no knowledge of this war, and close to zero background for anything related. Just spent last years reading ww2,then little about soviet-Afghanistan conflict(s), then it was turn for reading up about French troops and Dien Bien Phu.

谢谢你，我对这场战争一无所知，而且几乎没有任何相关的背景知识。刚刚花了几年时间阅读二战的资料，然后是阅读一些苏联和阿富汗的冲突，现在轮到阅读关于法国军队和奠边府战役的资料了。

librarianhuddz -> MaterialCarrot
That book made me coooooold. Just reading it I could feel my hands starting to freeze.

那本书让我感觉非常冷。只是读着它，我就能感觉到我的手开始结冰了。

MaterialCarrot -> librarianhuddz
Agree 100%. I grew up in the Midwest and am familiar with cold winters, but some of those chapters made me practically miserable just to read.

完全同意。我在中西部长大，熟悉寒冷的冬天，但是其中的一些章节仅仅是读起来，就让我觉得很痛苦。

Commodify -> MaterialCarrot
According to the Chinese, at peak strength they had about 1.5 million men in Korea. Peak strength for the US was 330,000. In 4 years of combat 35,000 Americans died in Korea. In the less than two years of combat that China was involved they, according to the Chinese government, sustained over 180,000 deaths, with speculation that the number could be much higher.
Good post but on this part you can't forget the South Koreans, who constituted the majority of both UN personnel and casualties. When they are thrown in, both force numbers and casualties between the Chinese and UN are far more even. More, it explains a lot of PVA success because the majority of the front was being covered by troops that were no more heavily armed than themselves.

引用“根据中国人的说法，他们在朝鲜高峰期的时候有大约150万人。而美国的最高兵力为33万人。在4年的战斗中，35000名美国人死在了朝鲜。根据中国的统计，在参与不到两年的战斗中，他们死亡人数超过了18万，人们猜测这个数字可能会更高。”
不错的帖子，但是在这一点上，你不能忘了韩国人，他们在联合国人员和伤亡人员中占大多数。当他们加入进来的时候，中国和联合国之间的军队数量和伤亡人数更加平均。更重要的是，这也解释了许多人民志愿军的成功，因为前线的大部分地区都被装备不如他们多的部队所覆盖。

Thtguy1289_NY -> Commodify
If you include South Koreans, then you need to include North Koreans as well. And we see an even greater casualty disparity, rather than an equalization

如果你包括韩国人，那么你也需要包括朝鲜人。我们看到的是更大的伤亡差距，而不是平均的。

Thtguy1289_NY -> Commodify
Well, it's not like the ROK faired great in the beginning either. They lost 70k+ men before the UN even got there!!

不过，韩国在一开始也表现得不是很好。在联合国军到达之前，他们就损失了7万多人！！

Jemnite -> MaterialCarrot
It's a bit strange to mention the logistical issues and yet cite logistics as an advantage. Supply lines for the PVA were absolutely horrendous with the rail-lines completely destroyed by the time that the PVA crossed the Yalu and the PVA had to resort pack animals and carrying much of their food and equipment with them (on foot). In addition, they were unable to transport supplies except for the dark hours of the morning/night thanks to overwhelming task force air superiority. The PVA couldn't even secure airspace above their own headquarters, which led to the death of Mao's son by airstrike. By the time the PVA launched the Third Phase Offensive, they had effectively outrun their supply lines despite only marching around 600-700 miles south of the Yalu.
There's a tendency to mistake the astounding strategic mobility of the PVA to logistics. However the ability of the PVA to shift large amounts of troops around to the complete surprise and bafflement of the UN task force was not because of logistics, but despite them. The PVA applied extremely rigorous march and discipline, and displayed superior strategic capabilities which allowed them to seize and maintain the advantage of initiative despite being in a markedly inferior logistics position.

提到后勤问题，却又把他们(中国)的后勤作为优势，这有点奇怪。人民志愿军的补给线绝对是糟糕的，铁路线在志愿军穿过鸭绿江时就被完全摧毁，志愿军不得不借助驮运的牲口，带着他们的大部分食物和设备(步行)。此外，由于特遣部队压倒性的空中优势，他们无法运输物资，只能在清晨或夜晚的黑暗时间运输。志愿军甚至无法保护他们自己总部上空的空域，这导致了毛的儿子在空袭中牺牲。当志愿军发动第三阶段攻势时，尽管他们只是在鸭绿江以南行进了大约600-700英里，但实际上已经超出了他们的补给线。
人们往往会把志愿军惊人的战略机动性误认为是后勤因素。然而，志愿军能够调动大量部队，让联合国特遣部队感到完全意外和困惑，不是因为有后勤，而是尽管后勤这样。志愿军采用了极其严格的行军和纪律，并显示出优越的战略能力，这使他们能够在后勤处于明显劣势的情况下，还能抓住并保持主动的优势。

MaterialCarrot -> Jemnite
I don't disagree, but to understand my point, take China as it existed in 1950 and the US as it existed in 1950 and then have them fighting in Oregon, rather than Korea. A completely different situation that would afford the US an ENORMOUS advantage.
That's my point. The strategic logistical situation for the Chinese compared to the US with the war being fought on the Chinese border was highly favorable, even though on a operational level the Chinese struggled mightily with logistics.

我不反对，但是为了理解我的观点，我们就拿1950年的中国和1950年的美国来说，然后让他们在俄勒冈州而不是在朝鲜作战。一个完全不同的局面将给美国带来巨大的优势。
这就是我的观点。与美国相比，中国的战略后勤形势非常有利，尽管在作战层面上，中国在后勤方面遇到了巨大的困难。

Jemnite -> MaterialCarrot
I think that analogy sort of falls apart when you consider that China in 1950 couldn't even make it to Japan let alone fight in Oregon. But I get your point. I just don't think it's a decisive factor in PVA performance considering it was the bare minimum for them to even enter the war.

我认为，当你考虑到1950年的中国甚至无法到达日本，更不用说在俄勒冈州战斗了，这个类比有点站不住脚。但我明白你的意思。我只是不认为这是志愿军出色表现的一个决定性因素，考虑到这甚至是他们加入战争的最低程度的配置。

FlashbackHistory -> MaterialCarrot
There are a lot of problems with this take.
Numbers...
The Chinese numerical advantage often gets overstated as part of the "Red Chinese Hordes" mythos. Let's look at some more relevant numbers.
During the war, the Chinese sent 2.4 million troops to Korea (1.9 million, plus another 500,000 sent as replacements), with another 500,000-600,000 militia in rear-area support roles.
During the war years, 1,789,000 million American personnel served in the Far East (mostly in Korea, with some in Japan and the Philippines). But ... the UN Command wasn't just Americans. When it came to foreign troops, there were Brits (55,000), Canadians (25,000), Turks (15,000), Australians (8,500), Filipinos (7,500), Thais (6,000), Dutchmen (5,000), Colombians (5,000), and more! On top of that, you have the massive numbers of South Koreans. Getting numbers for total ROKA and ROKMC enlistments during the war is tricky, plus overall numbers are muddled by the use of policemen and student-soldiers. But to give some idea of the manpower we're talking about consider that by July 1953, South Korea had 554,000 men in its army. At this point point, almost 25,000 of these men were serving in American and British units as KATUSAs and KATCOMs, making up as much as 10-20% of some nominally "American" units. Large numbers of Koreans were also working as porters and in other support roles. And when you look at South Korean military losses (187,000 dead is the official figure), they actually end up being comparable to China's admitted losses (180,000, although the actual number is likely higher).
UN forces and Communist forces had surprisingly comparable troop levels in-theater for much of the war. Communist forces did outnumber UN ones for much of the war, but the overall odds weren't 10:1 or 5:1 and there were plenty of periods where the odds weren't even 3:1 or 2:1. Indeed, by the time the war ended in 1953, the Chinese-North Korean side had about 1.5 million men versus 1 millon South Koreans, Americans, and other UN troops.
Logistics…
I'll just reiterate what I said the last time you tried to argue this.
In virtually all cases, UN forces were much better supplied than the Chinese. American ships alone mover over 30 million tons of cargo into Korea during the war. The entire Chinese logistical effort moved a little over 5.5 million tons. The Communists had to deal with shortages of trucks that forced them to carry a lot of tonnage with coolies and oxcarts to move. On top of that, there was constant interdiction from aircraft and warships that made daylight operations suicidal. The UNC had none of those constraints. If you look at things like the disparity between shells fired, the scale of the Chinese logistical disadvantage is blatantly obvious.
In fact, the UN supply lines for some items were much shorter than the Chinese ones. The US had the huge advantage of being able to use Japan as a staging area and production center. Everything from napalm tanks to boots were made in Japan and shipped the short distance to Korea. Meanwhile, any Soviet-made supplies had to be shipped hundreds and hundreds of miles.
The idea that the US couldn't support large numbers of troops in Asia is also pretty absurd, given that it had already supported a much, much bigger and much more active force in the area just five years earlier...

你这个观点有很多问题。
关于“数量”...
作为“红色中国大军”谣言的一部分，中国的人数优势常常被夸大。让我们来看看一些更相关的数字。
战争期间，中国向朝鲜派遣了240万军队(190万，另外50万作为替补)，还有50万至60万民兵在后方提供支援。
战争期间，有178.9万美国人在远东服役(大部分在朝鲜，还有一些在日本和菲律宾)。但是... 联合国军不只有美国人。说到外国军队，有英国人(5.5万人)、加拿大人(2.5万人)、土耳其人(1.5万人)、澳大利亚人(8,500人)、菲律宾人(7,500人)、泰国人(6,000人)、荷兰人(5,000人)、哥伦比亚人(5,000人)等等！除此之外，还有大量的韩国人。要获得战争期间韩国军队和韩国海军陆战队的总人数是很困难的，再加上警察和学生兵，总人数就很模糊了。但是为了让我们对我们正在谈论的人数有所了解，我们来看看1953年7月，韩国有55.4万名军人。在这一点上，大约有2.5万人在美国和英国部队服役，作为附编韩军，占一些名义上的“美国”军队的10-20%。大量韩国人也从事搬运工和其他辅助工作。如果你看看韩国的军事损失(官方数字是18.7万人死亡)，他们实际上最终与中国承认的损失（18万人，尽管实际数字可能更高）相当。
在这场战争的大部分时间里，联合国部队和志愿军在战场上的兵力水平惊人地相当。在战争的大部分时间里，志愿军的数量确实超过了联合国军队，但是总体比率不是10:1或5:1，而且有很多时候比率甚至不到3:1或2:1。事实上，到1953年战争结束时，中朝双方约有150万人，而韩国、美国和其他联合国部队有100万人。
关于“后勤”...
我只是重复一下上次你们争论这个问题时，我说过的话。
在几乎所有情况下，联合国部队的后勤都比志愿军好得多。在战争期间，仅美国舰船就运送了超过3000万吨的货物进入朝鲜。整个中国的后勤运输量略高于550万吨。中国不得不处理卡车短缺的问题，这迫使他们用苦力和牛车搬运大量吨位的货物。此外，飞机和军舰不断的阻拦使得在白天无法行动。联合国军没有这些限制。如果你看看发射的炮弹之间的差距，中国在后勤方面的劣势是显而易见的。
事实上，联合国军的一些物资补给线比中国的补给线短得多。美国有巨大的优势，能够把日本作为集结地和生产中心。从凝固汽油弹坦克到靴子，所有的东西都是在日本制造的，然后用船运到不远的朝鲜。与此同时，任何苏联制造的补给品都必须运输到数百英里之外的地方。
认为美国无法在亚洲支持大量军队的想法也相当荒谬，因为就在5年前，美国已经在该地区支持了一支规模大得多、活跃得多的军队...

Wenuven -> MaterialCarrot
Allied overconfidence. The US (MacArthur in particular) ignored clear
indications that the Chinese were going to intervene. This hubris
resulted in US/SK/Allied forces being caught off balance when the
Chinese attacked. Much of the second half of the Korean War was the
Allies recovering from being knocked off balance.
I'd argue that the hubris was thinking he could win the PR war sacrificing American lives for the sake of drawing the US into a full scale war with China a la Thermopylae and Sparta/Persia. Believing that Americans wouldn't swallow losing to their "inferiors".
Remember this is the generation of military leaders that bought into their own divinity and racial / sociocultural divides were still very real.

引用“美国(尤其是麦克阿瑟)忽视了中国准备进行干预的明确迹象。这种傲慢导致美国/韩国/盟军在中国进攻时失去平衡。朝鲜战争后半期的大部分时间是盟军从被打乱的平衡中恢复过来。”
我认为，他的傲慢是认为他可以赢得公关战争，牺牲美国人的生命，以便将美国拉入与中国的全面战争，就像温泉关战役和斯巴达/波斯战争那样。相信美国人不会容忍输给比他们“低等的人”。
请记住，这一代的军事领导人深信自己的神性，种族/社会文化的分歧仍然非常真实。

CanadaJack -> Wenuven
This is also the particular military leader who fought tooth and nail to just nuke them.

这也是指那个竭尽全力想用核武器攻击他们的军事领导人。

PandaBearShenyu -> MaterialCarrot
Numbers of course.
Uh, no. I can't believe this hUMAn WAvE talking point got dug back out of the grave where it belonged.
No the Chinese did not have "tremendous strength of numbers", nor did they ever have 1.5 million troops in Korea in remotely relevant terms. When you have basically no logistics, you need to field a much larger number of troops because most of them will be in transit. See battle of Shanghai where on paper the KMT fielded 3-4 times the number of troops as the IJA but in actual combat the number of actual fighting KMT troops were a fraction of the IJA's deployment where it mattered because most of the KMT troops were in transit.
When you have actual logistics, you need to field much fewer troops on paper to match your adversary in actual combat.
The peak PVA deployment in the area of fighting is at best comparable to UN forces. The Chinese never had the logistics to support a prolonged deployment of troops in combat zones remotely close to the UN due to the latter enjoying complete air superiority.
The PVA employed very sophisticated short attacks that used multiple highly mobile small squads to attack UN positions from multiple directions to seem like large numbers, they also use this to cut off UN positions from each other.

引用“当然是数量...”
呃，不，我真不敢相信这种“人海战术”的观点被从它本该呆的墓里挖出来了。
不，中国没有“巨大的人数优势”，他们也从来没有在朝鲜驻扎过150万军队。当你基本上没有后勤保障的时候，你需要派遣更多的部队，因为他们中的大多数都在运输。看看上海战役，国民党在纸面上出动的兵力是日军的3-4倍，但在实战中，国民党实际部署的兵力只是日军皇军的一小部分，因为大部分国民党军队都在运输。
当你有实际的后勤保障时，你需要在纸面上投入更少的部队，以在实际战斗中与你的对手相抗衡。
在战斗地区志愿军的部署高峰，充其量和联合国部队相当。由于联合国享有完全的空中优势，中国从来没有后勤支持在离联合国很近的战区长期部署部队。
志愿军使用非常复杂的短促突击的攻击方式，使用多个高度机动的小分队从多个方向攻击联合国阵地，看起来像人数众多，他们也使用这种方式切断联合国阵地之间的联系。

Logistics. Despite what I said about Chinese logistics problems (and they definitely had them), the Korean War was fought right next to China, whereas outside of SK, the US and most of its allies were fighting at the end of a several thousand mile long logistics chain. The US had and used very effectively it's massive firepower advantage, but in no reality could the US put millions of US troops in Korea the way the Chinese could walk them in.
This is complete intellectual dishonesty or hopefully just pure ignorance. UN airplanes bombed everything that moved in Korea, and that is not an exaggeration, every village, road, town, city, in North Korea was bombed and up to 30% of the North Korean civilian population were killed. Of the 7000 trucks the CHinese had, they lost more than half of that in the first month. They had no logistics lines. The vast majority of Chinese casualties came from starvation, freezing, and disease, not combat.
After the first months, the Chinese had no ability to launch any large scale assault or change the tide of the war. Even then holding the 38th parallel for 3 years is nothing short of a miracle. Throwing literal rocks down a mountain slope at American troops was not at all uncommon for the PVA and many units straight up had no ammo and had their bayonets permanently attached.

引用“后勤。尽管我说过中国的后勤问题(他们肯定存在这些问题)，但朝鲜战争就在中国旁边打，而在韩国之外，美国及其大多数盟友都在几千英里长的后勤链的末端打。美国曾非常有效地利用了它的强大火力优势，但在现实中，美国绝不可能像中国那样向朝鲜派遣数百万美军。”
这说法完全是学术上的不诚实，或者但愿只是纯粹的无知。联合国的飞机轰炸了朝鲜的一切，毫不夸张地说，朝鲜的每个村庄、道路、城镇、城市都遭到轰炸，多达30%的平民被杀害。在中国拥有的7000辆卡车中，他们在第一个月就损失了一半以上。他们没有后勤保障。绝大多数中国人的伤亡来自饥饿、严寒和疾病，而不是战斗。
在最初的几个月后，中国没有能力发动任何大规模的进攻，也没有能力改变战争的趋势。即使这样，保持三八线长达三年，也不失为一个奇迹。从山坡上向美国军队扔石头对志愿军来说并不少见，很多部队直接就没有弹药，一直随身携带刺刀。

The Chinese had no relevant logistics capability. Being closer to China doesn't mean you can use some kind of magic anime power to will supplies across hundreds of miles of a country with no functioning bridges, roads, rail that are being patrolled by the biggest deployment of U.S. air power ever 24/7. Chinese troops famously only ever moved at night when American planes couldn't see them. This is not make believe land where you point to a map with your crayon and go "this close, have supply, this far, no supply."
The intellectual dishonesty part comes from the wilful ignorance of how logistics works, we could ship a birthday cake into Germany during world war II and supply our troops better than Nazi troops in their own homeland. Distance is not a factor when you:
* Have the supplies
* Have the production
* Can transport all this shit to the field of operation.
The only disadvantage would be the opening of the war if you needed the first shipments to arrive, but after that, your apparently disadvantage from distance is functionally non-existent. Oh and we also outproduced the Chinese at that point to a factor of 300 to 1, more than the disparity with the Japanese by multiples.

中国没有相关的后勤能力。靠近中国并不意味着你可以使用某种神奇的动漫力量，在一个没有桥梁、公路和铁路的国家里，穿越数百英里，并有美国最大的空中力量全天候巡逻的情况下，提供补给。众所周知，中国军队只在美国飞机看不到的夜晚行动。这不像你用蜡笔指着地图说“这么近，有补给，这么远，没有补给。”
学术上的不诚实部分，来自于对后勤工作的故意忽视，在二战期间，我们可以把生日蛋糕运到德国，为我们的军队提供比纳粹在自己的祖国更好的补给。距离不是一个因素，当你：
* 拥有补给，
* 拥有生产力，
* 拥有可以把这些玩意运到战场上去的能力。
唯一的劣势是，在战争开始的时候，如果你需要第一批货物到达，但是在那之后，远距离方面的明显劣势就不复存在了。噢，当时我们的产量也超过了中国，达到了300比1，比和日本的差距还要大好几倍。

UN on the other hand had no threat whatsoever to their logistics lines and were presented with none of the issues. The Chinese had an understanding that they basically had 20 minutes to fight before the UN troops basically erected a wall of flame around their positions.
Your argument seems to imply that the Chinese performed well because they were "politically motivated" and "had tremendous numbers", had no logistics when you wanted to talk down about them and suddenly had logistics when you needed them to seem like a credible threat that the UN overcame.
The real reason is:
Yes, the PLA troops are extremely motivated, and PLA doctrine to this day is to be hyper disciplined and to be extremely aggressive, much more so than their enemies in combat.
The PLA just came off of fighting multiple wars with ample experience in guerrilla fighting against the Japanese, and field battles including water crossing against the KMT. Their elite troops were comparable to alpines troops in terms of their ability to fighting in difficult terrain and harsh weather.
insane levels of discipline and political purity since those that weren't died during the long march, and as you said, the Chinese gauged correctly that allowing the U.S. to occupy all of Korea was an existential threat and they just finished their last century of humiliation from foreign invaders.
Having big numbers and being politically motivated don't win you wars alone, sorry to say but that wasn't the case since World War I when everyone found out the hard way. The Chinese were just excellent, albeit severely under and sometimes un-equipped and supplied warfighters.

另一方面，联合国的后勤线没有任何威胁，也没有遇到任何问题。中国人明白，在联合国军在他们的阵地周围竖起一堵火墙之前，他们基本上只有20分钟的战斗时间。
你的论点似乎暗示，中国表现出色，是因为他们“有政治动机”，“人数众多”，当你想贬低他们时，他们没有后勤保障，当你需要他们，让他们看起来像是联合国克服的一个可信威胁时，他们就突然有了后勤保障。
真正的原因是：
是的，中国人民解放军的士气非常高涨，直到今天，解放军的信条仍然是纪律严明和极富攻击性，比他们在战斗中的敌人更甚。
解放军那时刚刚结束了多场战争，拥有丰富的抗日游击战经验，以及包括四渡赤水在内的对国民党的野战经验。他们的精锐部队在困难地形和恶劣天气条件下的战斗能力，可以和阿尔卑斯山地部队匹敌。
正如你所说的，中国人正确地判断了让美国占领整个朝鲜是一种生存威胁，他们刚刚结束了来自外国侵略者的百年屈辱，所以他们的纪律和政治纯洁性达到了前所未有的程度。
只有人数众多和政治动机并不能让你赢得战争，很抱歉地说，但是自从一战以来，情况就不是这样了，当时每个人都经历了艰难的过程。中国人就是很出色，尽管物资严重不足，有时甚至缺乏装备和补给的作战人员。

MightyVanguard -> MaterialCarrot
Adding into the logistical issues, the Chinese sent into Korea weren't as mechanized as the allied troops, and had access to the north Koreans who knew mountain paths that could be traversed on foot, but not easily with vehicles. With these advantages, they could march men on these paths past the allies.

除了后勤问题之外，中国派往朝鲜的部队没有像盟军那么机械化，可以接触到朝鲜人，他们知道可以徒步穿过的山路，但车辆不容易通过。有了这些优势，他们就可以在这些山路上行军，绕过盟军。

Commodify
The single most important factor was terrain. Korea at the time was mostly forested. The PVA's victory in Korea was neither the first nor the most impressive victory of light infantry against a more heavily armed force in the forests. The Japanese and Finns had done even better as far as loss ratio was concerned ten years earlier. The terrain restricted the mobility of the round-bound Americans. It forced tanks to travel in column, and the PVA could destroy the columns by disabling the front and rear tanks. Forests further reduced aerial reconnaissance potential, safeguarded the PVA from airstrikes, and reduced visibility in general. That allowed the PVA to creep up on UN forces and attack at short distances, where artillery bombardment would lead to friendly fire.
Next, the UN's firepower advantage only applied to limited segments of the front. The majority of UN troops were South Korean, and they were no more heavily armed than the Chinese.
Third, the Americans suffered from maladaptive SOP. While the Marines (those of whom who had actually seen combat in the Pacific, that is) had experience with "short attacks" through fighting the Japanese, the army was used to big conventional battles in Europe. More, the marines had only defended against Japanese attacks in the confines of an island, with overwhelming naval fire support available at any time. They rarely had to consider the threat of a flanking attack, an envelopment, or a deep penetration into their rear areas. They further always were numerically superior to the Japanese, while in Korea the Chinese usually had numerical superiority. The end result was an American army that had no idea how to counter an enemy whose basic operational method was to leverage vegetation, dead space, night, and bad weather to attack at short distances. It preferred to create strongpoints along roads - what one would do if resisting a German offensive - instead of contesting the surrounding forests and mountains. It wasn't until late in the war that Ridgeway was able to create a geographically sound defensive line.
In Korean war histories much noise has been made about MacArthur's "stupidity" in pushing beyond the Pyongyang chokepoint and the brilliance of Chinese tactics, but the reality is that the UN could have won the war despite both those things. Chinese SOP was not impossible to counter, the US army of 1950 simply had all the wrong ideas of how to fight an unconventional enemy.

最重要的一个因素是地形。当时朝鲜大部分地区都是森林。志愿军在朝鲜的胜利既不是第一次，也不是最令人印象深刻的轻装步兵在森林中对抗重装部队的胜利。日本人和芬兰人在十年前的损失率方面做得更好。地形限制了美国人的机动能力。迫使坦克排成纵队行进，而志愿军可以通过使前后坦克瘫痪，来摧毁纵队。森林进一步降低了侦察机的能力，保护了志愿军免受空袭，总体降低了能见度。这使得志愿军可以悄悄接近联合国部队进行短距离突击，而这距离的炮击将会导致误伤友军。
其次，联合国的火力优势只适用于前线的有限部分。大多数联合国军都是韩国人，他们的武器装备并不比中国人多。
第三，美国人受制于不适应的标准作战程序(SOP)。虽然海军陆战队(其中一些人实际上在太平洋战场上参加过战斗)在与日本人的战斗中有“短促突击”的经验，但陆军已经习惯了在欧洲进行大规模的常规战斗。更重要的是，海军陆战队只在一个岛屿范围内防御日本人的攻击，而且在任何时候都有压倒性的海军火力支援。他们很少考虑侧翼进攻、包围或者深入后方的威胁。他们在人数上总是优于日本人，而在朝鲜，中国人通常在人数上占优势。最终的结果是美国军队不知道如何对付敌人，他们的基本作战方法是利用植被、死角、夜晚和恶劣天气进行近距离攻击。它更喜欢沿着道路建立据点，如果是抵抗德国的进攻就会这样做，而不是争夺周围的森林和山脉。直到战争后期，李奇微才建立起一条地理上可靠的防线。
在朝鲜战争史上，人们对麦克阿瑟跨过平壤咽喉的“愚蠢”和中国高超的战术有很多的讨论，但现实是，尽管存在这两个情况，联合国本可以赢得这场战争的。中国的标准作战程序并不是不可对抗，1950年的美军只是对如何与非常规敌人作战的问题上，有错误的想法。

MaterialCarrot -> Commodify
Good post, I would just add on the terrain aspect is that Korea was (and of course still is) extremely mountainous. So as well as being heavily forested, the mountainous terrain further restricted and inhibited US forces that were built around firepower, mechanization, and mobility. The terrain gave a leg up to light infantry.

很好的帖子，我想补充一下地形方面的问题，韩国当时(当然现在也是)非常多山。因此，除了森林茂密之外，多山的地形进一步限制和抑制了围绕火力、机械化和机动性建立的美国部队。这地形有利于轻步兵。

YooesaeWatchdog1 -> Commodify
Another thing to note is that the US consisted of 40%+ global GDP at that point while China was one of the poorest countries in the world on par with Congo today. this sort of upset would be like Afghanistan fighting the US to a standstill.

另外值得注意的一点是，当时美国的GDP占全球的40%以上，而中国是世界上最贫穷的国家之一，与今天的刚果不相上下。这种难受，就像阿富汗与美国的作战陷入了僵局一样。

civver3 -> Commodify
the US army of 1950 simply had all the wrong ideas of how to fight an unconventional enemy
Foreshadowing the Vietnam War, to simplify it excessively. Makes me think generations often have to relearn how to fight wars.

引用“1950年的美军只是对如何与非常规敌人作战的问题上，有错误的想法。”
为越南战争埋下了伏笔，把它过分简化了。让我觉得，每代人常常不得不重新学习如何打仗。

FlashbackHistory
I've written answers here and here that get into this issue. The gist:
The Chinese achieved strategic surprise in the winter of 1950 and were able to launch two major offensives on largely unaware UN forces in northern Korea. The Chinese did some smart things to achieve these surprises, like mass camouflage and deception efforts. They also benefited from the willful ignorance of MacArthur and intel chief Charles Willoughby regarding the Chinese buildup on the Yalu. The Chinese also benefited from two limitations to UN air reconnaissance: Washington's ban on flights north of the Yalu and the pause on RB-29 flights caused by the appearance of Soviet-piloted MiG-15s in November 1950.

我已经在很多地方都写下了关于这个问题的回答，大意是：
中国在1950年冬天完成了战略突袭，并在朝鲜对几乎不知情的联合国部队发动了两次大规模进攻。为了达成这些出其不意，中国人做了一些聪明的事情，比如大规模伪装和设局。他们得益于麦克阿瑟和情报局长查尔斯-威洛比对中国在鸭绿江上的集结的故意无视。还得益于联合国侦察机的两个限制：华盛顿禁止鸭绿江以北的飞行，以及1950年11月苏联驾驶的米格-15战斗机的出现，导致RB-29飞行暂停。

The Chinese were sprinters, not marathon runners. They could achieve spectacular short-term successes ... but they often couldn't follow up those successes. During the mobile phase of the war in 1950-1951, Chinese logistics took months to stockpile the supplies that would be exhausted in a week-long offensive. With better sustainment, the Chinese might well have wiped out UN forces in November-December 1950 or April 1951.
At the tactical level, the Chinese were generally good about playing to their strengths and their enemies' weaknesses. They often fought at night and used the cover of terrain and darkness to reduce the efficacy of UN heavy weapons and airpower. They combined frontal attacks with flanking pincers to pin and annihilate entire enemy units.

中国人是短跑运动员，而不是马拉松运动员。他们可以在短期内取得惊人的成功... 但往往不能延续这些成功。在1950年至1951年的战争机动阶段，中国的后勤花了几个月的时间储备物资，而这些物资在一周的进攻中耗尽。如果有更好的后勤保障，中国很可能在1950年11月至12月或1951年4月消灭联合国部队。
在战术层面上，中国人通常善于利用自己的优势和敌人的弱点。他们经常在夜间作战，并利用地形和黑暗的掩护来降低联合国重型武器和空中力量的效能。他们把正面攻击和侧翼夹击结合起来，以锁定并消灭整个敌人的部队。

panick21
Since there are so many experts here, what if the US had captured Pyongyang and then established defensive lines across Korea. This would have lead to North Korea basically being a rump state right? Unlikely that China could have dialoged them from there.

既然这里有这么多的专家，如果美国占领了平壤，然后在朝鲜全境建立防线，会怎么样？这将导致朝鲜基本上成为一个废墟国家，对吧？中国不太可能在那里与他们对话。

Trick_Ad3016 -> panick21
This is basically what every Korea expert since the Korean War says that the US and ROK should have done. PVA would not have been able to overrun this defense line, and PRC might not even have intervened. And a rump NK would absolutely have fallen after the Cold War, and we would be living in a world with a reunified and peaceful Korea.
Instead we have a Korea where its northern half and nuclear-armed on top of that.
I guess hindsight is 20/20.

这基本上就是自朝鲜战争以来，每一个朝鲜问题专家所说的美国和韩国应该做的事情。志愿军不可能越过这条防线，中国甚至可能不会介入。冷战结束后，残破的朝鲜绝对会倒下，而我们将生活在一个统一、和平的朝鲜半岛的世界中。
然而事实相反，我们面对的是北半部拥有核武器的朝鲜。
我认为做事后诸葛亮是很容易的。

Plethorian
I think even more crucial was the fact that in the initial push south the North captured tremendous amounts of US arms and other supplies. We had to basically start from scratch, while the North could use our own arms against us.

我认为更重要的是，在最初向南推进的过程中，朝鲜缴获了大量美国武器和其他补给。我们基本上不得不从头开始，而朝鲜可以用我们自己的武器来对付我们。

AgoraiosBum
China had millions of veterans who had been fighting since 1937 - both against the Japanese and in the civil war - and were able to achieve strategic surprise and highly favorable ratios in its attack of 1950. After that point, China consistently had more troops, but the Allies had better supplies and logistics, and it was generally a stalemate.

中国有数以百万计的老兵，他们从1937年开始就一直在战斗，包括抗日战争和内战，并且能够在1950年的进攻中完成战略上的突击和高度有利的比率。此后，中国一直拥有更多的部队，但盟军拥有更好的补给和后勤，总体上是一场僵局。

Asahi220
PLA tactics, US arrogance, Surprise and Terrain
UN forces were already isolated from each other due to the terrain of North Korea and as units were already detached from each other and had very little ability to support if one unit came under attack this played into Chinese tactics perfectly as their modus operandi was to infiltrate and isolate individual units and defeat them in detail while simultaneously destroying rear command.
Add to the cluster the UN forces were basically in victory formation and did not keep it secret on how each unit was deployed and where so PLA forces new exactly where to attack. So you have these isolated units on cold rocky hills and mountains already hoping to be home for Christmas suddenly surrounded with rear command areas also under heavy attack. Then the PLA would set up ambush points a long lines of retreat and thus you get maximum casualties.
Suffice to say the US came away taking the wrong lessons from the conflict. The US took away that as long as there was no surprise and tight coordination between units could be maintained firepower would still win the day. Also to be disproved in Vietnam

解放军的战术，美国的傲慢，突袭和地形
由于朝鲜的地形，联合国部队已经彼此孤立，而且部队已经相互分离，如果一支部队遭到攻击，联合国部队几乎没有支援能力，这完全符合中国的战术，因为他们的作战方式是渗透和孤立单个部队，并全面击败他们，同时摧毁后方指挥部。
此外，联合国部队基本上处于胜利阵型，并且没有对每个部队的部署方式和部署地点保密，因此志愿军知道确切的攻击地点。因此，你有这些孤立的部队在寒冷的岩石山丘和山脉上，他们已经希望回家过圣诞节，突然被包围，后方指挥区也受到猛烈攻击。然后志愿军设置伏击点，形成一条长长的撤退线，这样你就得到了最大的伤亡。
可以说，美国从这场冲突中吸取了错误的教训。美国认为，只要不出其不意，并保持部队之间的紧密协调，火力优势仍然可以获胜。这点也在越南被推翻了。