[2020-02-17]中国不会犯日本在珍珠港所犯的错误

文章内容:
Key Point: This is a rival who seems to have learned from Yamamoto: don’t jab a sleeping giant, and if you do, don’t steel his resolve.

要点：这是一个似乎从山本五十六那里学到教训的对手：不要刺激沉睡的巨人，如果你这样做了，也不要让他下定决心。

As we afford our hallowed forebears the remembrance they deserve, let’s also try to learn from what transpired here seventy-five years ago, and see what it tells us about America’s future as an Asia-Pacific sea power.

在纪念我们荣耀的祖先们之际，让我们也来学习一下75年前在这里发生的事情，看看这事件对美国作为亚太海上强国的未来有什么启示。

In particular, let’s look at Pearl Harbor through the eyes of the enemy.

特别是，让我们通过敌人的角度来看珍珠港事件。

Why did Japan do it? Doing nothing is a viable strategic option, and oftentimes a good one. Imperial Japan would have been far better off had it forgone the attack on Pearl Harbor and confined its operations to the Western Pacific. Had Tokyo exercised some forbearance, it may have avoided rousing the “sleeping giant” that Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto reputedly said he feared so much. And even if it did awaken the American giant, it would have avoided filling him with what Yamamoto called a “terrible resolve” to crush Japan. Think about it:

日本为什么要这么做？ 什么都不做是一个可行的战略选择，而且往往是一个好的选择。 如果日本帝国放弃美国珍珠港事件，将行动范围限制在西太平洋，那么日本帝国的情况会好得多。 如果东京方面有所克制，也许就不会唤醒这个沉睡的巨人，据说山本五十六上将曾说过他非常害怕这个巨人。 即使真的唤醒了这个美国巨人，也会避免让这个巨人充满山本所说的，摧毁日本的“可怕决心”。 想想看吧:

• By attacking Oahu, Japan took on a second full-blown war in the Pacific Ocean while waging a massive land war on the continent of Asia. Bear in mind that Japan had already been at war for a decade by the time it attacked Hawaii; the Imperial Japanese Army invaded Manchuria in 1931 and China proper in 1937. This was a mammoth undertaking. When the shooting stopped in 1945, some 1.8 million Japanese troops were left in China, Manchuria and Korea. That illustrates the dimensions of the ground war—a war comparable in scale to the maritime war.

•日本通过进攻瓦胡岛，在太平洋发动了第二场全面战争，同时在亚洲大陆发动了一场大规模陆地战争。 不要忘记，日本在袭击夏威夷时已经打了十年仗；日本帝国军队在1931年入侵满洲，1937年入侵中国本土。这是一项庞大的任务。当1945年枪战停止时，大约有180万日军留在中国、满洲和朝鲜。 这说明了地面战争的规模——这场战争的规模堪比海上战争。

• Japan picked a fight with a foe boasting vastly greater economic and industrial power, and it fired that foe’s resolve to translate economic and industrial resources—potential military power, in other words—into deployable military might on a scale that Japan had little hope of matching. George Baer, the author of an award-winning history of the United States Navy, reminds us that our navy’s shipbuilding budget for 1940 alone exceeded a decade’s worth of Imperial Japanese Navy shipbuilding budgets. That shows what Japan was up against.

•日本与一个自称拥有更强大经济和工业实力的敌人展开了一场战斗，激发了敌人将经济和工业资源(换句话说，潜在的军事力量)转化为可部署的军事力量的决心，而日本几乎没有希望能实现这种规模。乔治 · 贝尔曾写过一本《美国海军史》，他提醒我们，仅1940年一年，我们海军的造船预算就超过了日本帝国海军十年的造船预算。 这表明了日本所面临的问题。

• And after the sleeping giant had started awake, the Japanese leadership failed to walk back its ambitious political and strategic aims. It tried to defend the vast territories it overran in 1941–42—and never really adapted to the new circumstances it had created by poking a slumbering America.

•在这个沉睡的巨人开始苏醒之后，日本领导层未能收回其雄心勃勃的政治和战略目标。 它试图保卫它在1941年至1942年间占领的广大领土，但却从未真正适应它通过刺激沉睡中的美国所创造的新环境。

Picking a fight with a stronger enemy, enraging that enemy and refusing to admit the likelihood of defeat—that adds up to “self-defeating behavior” of the first order on the part of Japan’s military rulers. And the repercussions were hardly unexpected. We know they were foreseeable because perceptive Japanese military men foresaw them.

挑起与更强大的敌人的战斗，激怒敌人，拒绝承认失败的可能性，这些行为加起来就是日本军事统治者的“自毁行为”。 这种结果并不出人意料。 我们知道这都是可预见的，因为敏锐的日本军人预见到了。

Admiral Yamamoto, to name one, caught sight of how the war would unfold. He compared fighting the United States to “fighting the whole world.” The mismatch in economic and military power would be that lopsided once American industry was in full gear, turning out war materiel in vast quantities. Yamamoto told his political superiors: “If you insist that we really do it, you may trust us for the perfect execution of a breath-taking show of naval victories for the first half-year or full year. But if the war should be prolonged into a second or third year, I am not confident at all.”

举个例子，山本海军上将看到了战争将如何展开。 他把对抗美国比作“对抗整个世界” 一旦美国工业全速运转，大量生产战争物资，经济和军事力量将是不平衡的。 山本向他的政治上级表示: “如果你坚持认为我们真的要这么做，那么你可以相信我们在半年或一年里，能够完美的获得让人惊叹的海军战绩。但如果战争延长到第二年或第三年，我就完全没有信心了。”

Nor should he have been. As we know from the history books, the war did spill into a second year, 1942–43, and then into a third, 1943–44, and into a fourth. By late 1943, what amounted to a second complete U.S. Navy—the shiny, new, higher-tech fleet authorized by Congress under the Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940—was steaming into the combat theater to do battle. Events bore out Yamamoto’s prophecy once that force arrived on scene—and began overpowering Imperial Japanese Navy defenders.

他也不应该这么做。 从历史书上我们知道，这场战争的确发展到了第二年，1942年至1943年，然后是第三年，1943年至1944年，最后是第四年。 到1943年底，第二支完整的美国海军——1940年美国国会根据双洋海军法，授权的闪亮、全新、高科技的舰队正驶入战场进行战斗。一旦这批武力到达现场，事件证实了山本的预言，并开始压倒日本帝国海军的防御力量。

So Yamamoto was right: Japan had to win quickly or not at all. But he was also wrong: by executing his plan to strike Pearl Harbor, the Imperial Japanese Navy guaranteed there would be no quick win. So, again: if the outcome was predictable, why did they do it? What should they have done?

所以山本说的是对的：日本必须迅速取得胜利，否则后面根本不可能获胜。但他也错了：通过执行打击珍珠港的计划，日本帝国海军不可能会很快取得胜利。 所以，再一次：如果结果是可以预测的，他们为什么要这么做？ 他们应该怎么做？

This is a roundabout way of getting to the beginning. Let’s ask “what if?” as we look back seventy-five years to the Japanese aerial assault on this place. Now, as a Naval War College professor of strategy, I am required to mention our patron saint—our holiest of holies, the German military theorist Carl von Clausewitz—every time I give a talk like this one. So here’s a pearl of wisdom from the great Carl: no fair Monday-morning quarterbacking!

这是回到开始的迂回方式。当我们回顾七十五年前，日本对这个地方的空袭， 让我们问一下“如果呢? ”。 现在，作为一名海军战争学院战略学教授，每次我发表类似这样的演讲时，都必须提到我们的守护神——我们最伟大荣耀的人，德国军事理论家卡尔•冯•克劳塞维茨。这里，伟大的卡尔给了我们一句至理名言：不应该放马后炮！

To learn from past failures, in other words, it’s not enough to second-guess what commanders or statesmen of bygone ages did wrong amid the fury of war. To truly learn from them, we have to envision some alternative course of action that would have yielded better results than the one they took.

换句话说，要从过去的失败中吸取教训，仅仅怀疑过去的指挥官或政治家，在激烈的战争中做错了什么是不够的。 为了真正从他们身上学到东西，我们必须想出一些替代行动方案，这些方案会比他们所采取的方案，产生更好的结果。

Makes sense, doesn’t it? No one likes the armchair QB in New England, my adopted home, who takes Bill Belichick or Tom Brady to task for substandard play in a Patriots defeat. The natural response—the Clausewitzian response—is to ask: okay, what would you have done better, wise guy? Or if you prefer your rejoinders more highfalutin, my hero Teddy Roosevelt proclaimed that it’s not the critic who counts, but the man in the arena, splattered with sweat and blood but getting it done.

很有道理，不是吗？ 在我的第二故乡新英格兰，没有人喜欢纸上谈兵的人，他们指责比尔 · 贝利奇克或汤姆 · 布雷迪在爱国者队的失利中表现不佳。而自然的反应就像克劳塞维茨式的反应，他问： 好吧，聪明的家伙，你能做得更好吗？或者，如果你更喜欢自命不凡反驳的话，我心目中的英雄泰迪•罗斯福称，真正重要的不是评论家，而是场上那个洒满汗水和鲜血的人。

First consider the failure of Japanese strategy as strategy. What did Japanese want in the Pacific? To oversimplify, they wanted to partition that ocean between Japan and the United States. The waters, skies and landmasses west of Asia’s “second island chain”—a loose line of islands stretching from northern Japan through Guam down to New Guinea—would become a Japanese preserve.

首先把日本失败的战略看作是一种战略。 日本人在太平洋想要什么？简单的说，他们想要在日本和美国之间划分这片海洋。 亚洲“第二岛链”以西的水域、天空和陆地将成为日本的保护区。“第二岛链”是一条松散的岛屿线，从日本北部一直延伸到关岛，直到新几内亚。

To accomplish such an ambitious goal, the resource-poor island state desperately needed imports of raw materials—primarily from Southeast Asia. That lent even more momentum to Tokyo’s plans for aggression.

为了实现这一雄心勃勃的目标，这个资源匮乏的岛国迫切需要进口原材料——主要来自东南亚。 这为日本的侵略计划提供了更大的动力。

In effect, then, Tokyo envisioned enclosing its territorial conquests and sources of natural resources within a long, distended defense perimeter that coincided, more or less, with the second island chain. It would barricade them off from outsiders. Japanese strategists had seen the United States as the next likely enemy in the Pacific since shortly after the turn of the century. The Imperial Japanese Navy had eradicated Chinese sea power during a short, sharp war in 1895, then turned around and crushed the Russian Navy in naval battles in 1904 and 1905—putting an end to Russian sea power in the Far East for decades to come.

实际上，当时东京设想把它的领土占领和自然资源封闭在一个长而宽的防御范围内，这或多或少与第二岛链相吻合。 将把他们与外界隔绝开来。日本的战略家们在世纪之交后不久就已经把美国视为太平洋地区的下一个可能的敌人。 1895年，日本帝国海军在一场短暂而激烈的战争中消灭了中国的海上力量，然后在1904年和1905年的海战中逆转，击溃了俄罗斯海军，从而在未来几十年里终结了俄罗斯在远东的海上力量。

That left the United States Navy as the next big thing for Japan’s navy. Japanese strategists set to work determining how to overcome another strong yet faraway foe—just as U.S. naval strategists in places like the Naval War College pondered how to project military might into a determined opponent’s home region, thousands of miles from American shores.

这使得美国海军成为日本海军的下一个重要目标。 日本战略家开始着手研究如何战胜另一个强大而又遥远的敌人——就像美国海军战争学院等地的海军战略家们，考虑如何将军事力量投射到距离美国海岸数千英里的敌国本土上。

Think about what Japan was contemplating from a geographic and geometric perspective. Every time Japan extended its defense perimeter eastward or southward was like extending the radius of a circle: it expanded the sea area Japan’s fleet had to police by the square of the distance. And perversely, Tokyo had an insatiable appetite for more sea space. It was constantly extending the defensive frontier—including at far-flung places like Guadalcanal, in late 1942. The circle got bigger and bigger, Japanese naval coverage thinner and thinner. The Imperial Japanese Navy’s reach exceeded its grasp by mid-1942—just as Yamamoto had foreseen.

从地理学和几何学的角度考虑一下日本在考虑什么。 日本每次向东或向南扩展其防御范围时，就像是扩大了一个圆的半径：这就扩大了日本舰队不得不管辖的海域。反常的是，东京对更多的海洋空间有着永不满足的胃口。它不断扩大防御范围——包括1942年底在瓜达尔卡纳尔这样偏远的地方。这个圆圈越来越大，日本海军能覆盖的范围也越来越小。到1942年中期，正如山本所预见的那样，日本帝国海军的影响力已经超出了自己的能力。

But the problem was worse than policing vast sea areas: trying to defend a long defensive line is hard, at sea or on land. Think about it. If I want to defend a line, I have to be stronger than my opponent at every point along the perimeter. That verges on impossible. By contrast, my opponent only has to be stronger than me at one point along the line. He can mass forces at some point along the line and punch through. There’s no such thing as an impenetrable defensive wall sprawling across hundreds or thousands of miles. That’s a fallacy.

但是这个问题比管理广阔的海域还要糟糕：无论是在海上还是在陆地上，试图保卫一条长长的防线都是很困难的。想想吧。如果我想要防守一条线，我必须在线外的每一个点都比我的对手更强，但这几乎是不可能的。相比之下，我的对手只需要在一点上比我强既可以。他可以在这条线的某一点集中力量，然后穿过去。世界上没有一堵密不透风、绵延数百或数千英里的防御墙。这是谬论。

In short, Japan had put itself in an impossible position unless it could keep the U.S. offensive halfhearted. And it could have. Clausewitz teaches that the elements of strength are force—by which he means material resources—and will. A combatant like the United States can boast all the economic and industrial resources in the world, yet remain militarily weak if it lacks the resolve to tap those resources, converting latent into actual military might.

简而言之，日本已经把自己置于一个不可能的位置，除非它能让美国的进攻不专心。本来是可以的。 克劳塞维茨教导我们，强大的要素是实力——他指的是物质资源和决心。像美国这样的战士可以夸耀自己拥有世界上所有的经济和工业资源，但如果缺乏开发这些资源的决心，将潜在的资源转化为实际的军事力量，那么它的军事力量仍然很弱。

Japan, in other words, could weaken America by being less provocative than it was. It could avoid firing Americans’ passion for war, and thus their desire to construct and deploy a vast military machine. Japan probably had to attack U.S. possessions to get its way.

换句话说，日本如果不去挑衅美国，就有可能削弱美国。它可以避免点燃美国人对战争的热情，以及他们建造和部署庞大军事机器的欲望。日本可能不得不攻击美国的领土，来达到自己的目的。

Attacking Pearl Harbor stoked popular desire for vengeance. That passion—that terrible resolve—fueled the twin counteroffensives commanded by Adm. Chester Nimitz and Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Tokyo may have had to awaken the sleeping giant to accomplish its goals in the Pacific—but it could have avoided filling him with rage and spite. It could have spared itself an all-out American onslaught.

偷袭珍珠港激起了美国民众复仇的欲望。 这种激情，这种可怕的决心，点燃了切斯特 · 尼米兹海军上将和道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟将军指挥的两次反攻。东京或许不得不唤醒这个沉睡的巨人，以实现其在太平洋地区的目标——但它本可以避免让美国充满愤怒和怨恨。它本可以避免美国的全面进攻。

Japanese war planners had long assumed the U.S. counteroffensive would remain limited in scope. They assumed Japanese forces would evict America from the Philippine Islands, and they assumed, rightly, that the U.S. Pacific Fleet planned to steam to the Philippines’ relief. They also knew the U.S. Pacific Fleet was stronger than their Combined Fleet—and thus had to be cut down to size for Japan’s navy to win.

日本战争策划者长期以来一直认为美国的反攻范围有限。他们认为日本军队将把美国从中东菲律宾驱逐出去，他们天真地认为，美国太平洋舰队会计划向菲律宾提供紧急援助。他们也知道美国太平洋舰队比他们的联合舰队更强大，因此不得不削减规模，这样日本海军就能取得胜利。

Thus they embraced a doctrine they called “interceptive operations,” whereby aircraft and submarines stationed in the outer Pacific islands would pepper the U.S. battle fleet with small-scale attacks on its westward voyage. If successful, they would wear down the Americans before they even reached the fighting theater. An apocalyptic sea battle—a reprise of the victories over China’s and Russia’s navies decades before—would settle matters somewhere in Western Pacific waters.

因此，他们实施了一种他们称之为“拦截行动”的战略，即驻扎在太平洋外岛的飞机和潜艇，在美国战斗舰队向西航行的时候，进行小规模的突击。如果成功的话，他们会在美国人到达战场之前就把他们拖垮。一场世界末日般的海战——将重现几十年前对中国和俄罗斯海军的胜利，问题将在西太平洋水域的某个地方解决。

Japan’s navy believed it stood a chance in action against a U.S. fleet enfeebled by attacks from the depths and aloft—and it was right. It is really, really hard to overcome on his own home ground, even if that antagonist is outmatched in terms of ships, planes and manpower. The Imperial Japanese Navy might deprive the U.S. Navy of the war-making implements on which it depended, as the strategy of interceptive operations envisioned. Or, in the best case from Tokyo’s standpoint, the price tag of entry into the Western Pacific might soar above the price America was willing to pay.

日本海军相信自己有机会利用深海和高空袭击，从而削弱的美国舰队，这是对的。在对手的地盘上，要战胜是非常非常困难的，即使这个对手在舰船、飞机和人力上都处于劣势。 日本帝国海军可能会根据拦截行动的战略，剥夺美国海军所依赖的作战工具。或者，从东京的角度来看，最好的情况是，美国进入西太平洋的代价，可能会高于美国愿意付出的代价。

If so, the United States might do the rational thing. They might shrug at the loss of the Philippines. They might write off the Western Pacific—ceding it to Japan by default. Tokyo would win without hazarding a pitched fleet battle.

如果是这样，美国可能会做出理性的选择。他们可能会对失去菲律宾不屑一顾。他们可能会放弃西太平洋，把它拱手让给日本。东京将会在不冒险进行一场激烈的舰队战斗的情况下取得胜利。

So the Pearl Harbor raid was fatally flawed as strategy. Japanese leaders could have gotten part or all of what they wanted by foregoing the Pearl Harbor attack. The Japanese leadership bartered away long-term strategic success for momentary gain. Attacking Battleship Row constituted “self-defeating behavior” of colossal proportions for the island empire.

因此，偷袭珍珠港的战略存在致命的缺陷。日本领导人本可以通过放弃偷袭珍珠港得到他们想要的部分或全部。日本领导层为了一时的利益而放弃了长期的战略成功。对于这个岛屿帝国来说，攻击美国的战列舰排，成为了巨大规模的“弄巧成拙的行为”。

China, unlike Japan, appears content to build up naval and air power along its periphery in hopes of rewriting the rules of the Asian order—the liberal order of seagoing trade and commerce over which America has presided since Japan’s downfall in 1945. While sometimes bellicose and always assertive, Beijing does not appear eager to pick a fight. It doesn’t appear to be in any particular hurry to fulfill its maritime destiny.

与日本不同，中国似乎满足于在其周边地区建立海军和空军力量，希望改写亚洲秩序的规则——自1945年日本垮台以来，美国一直主导着海上贸易和商业的自由秩序。尽管中国ZF有时表现得好战，而且总是咄咄逼人，但它似乎并不急于挑起争端。它似乎并不急于完成自己的海上使命。

In short, this is a rival who seems to have learned from Yamamoto: don’t jab a sleeping giant, and if you do, don’t steel his resolve. Let him slumber until it’s late in the contest, and you may prevail. China may have learned the true lessons of Pearl Harbor. Let’s do the same—and get ready.

简而言之，它似乎是一个从山本五十六那里学到教训的对手：不要刺激沉睡的巨人，如果你这样做了，也不要让其下定决心。让它沉睡到比赛快结束的时候，你就可以获胜了。中国可能已经从珍珠港事件中吸取了真正的教训。让我们也一样吸取教训，做好准备。

美国网友评论:
DavidB
"China Won't Make The Same Mistake That Japan Did At Pearl Harbor"
So your saying,They won't attack the United States. ↑:168 ↓:6

“中国不会重蹈日本在珍珠港的覆辙”，所以你说，他们不会攻击美国。

ALANC
Nobody is attacking anybody in a big global conflict. Stop the fear mongering. ↑:180 ↓:15

在全球大冲突中没有谁会攻击谁。停止散布恐惧。

D
Remember the prime movers in the history of human activity is not love, but power and control - driven by greed and hate. The Japanese leaders saw Japan as a rightful leader and controller of Asia. They began a war in China in 1931 and no one stopped their aggression. That Trump allowed the military to take a demonstration action in support of Taiwan was a good step. It would be wise to work our military support agreements with the Philippines and Taiwan to base US ships and aircraft as an effort to maintain the principle of Freedom of the Sea and free trade. The Beijing Government has shown that their long term goal is firm control of the Pacific beyond the Philippine islands and below Viet Nam. The US is clearly ignore the economic conquest campaign that China is adopting with their New Silk Road strategy - extend economic interests and then military assets to protect their new interests.. ↑:26 ↓:4

请记住，人类历史活动的主要推动者不是爱，而是权力和控制——由贪婪和仇恨驱动的。日本领导人视日本为亚洲的合法领导者和控制者。1931年他们在中国发动战争，没有人阻止他们的侵略。特朗普允许军方采取支持台湾的示威行动就是很好的一步。明智的做法是与菲律宾和台湾签订军事支持协议，为美国舰船和飞机提供基地，以维护海洋自由和自由贸易的原则。北京ZF已经表明，他们的长期目标是牢牢控制太平洋菲律宾群岛以外和越南以下的太平洋地区。美国显然忽视了中国正在采取的一带一路战略——扩大经济利益，然后是军事资产，以保护他们的新利益。

Mr.Jeffery H
The 3rd war with China is inevitable. We can delay it with reduced spending on Chinese products. China must have US dollar it obtain quality raw materials it needs to build its fleet and aircraft with. Boycott items made in communist nations. Stop future wars with long time enemies. ↑:40 ↓:7

与中国的第三次战争不可避免。我们可以通过减少对中国产品的支出来延缓这一趋势。中国必须拥有美元，才能获得建设舰队和飞机所需的优质原材料。抵制共产主义国家生产的商品。就能停止未来与长期敌人的战争。

Ron
China is a paper tiger with no actual military experience. The USA has honed its skills over decades of conflict. ↑:111 ↓:30

中国是一只纸老虎，没有实际的军事经验。美国在数十年的冲突中磨练了自己的技能。

Brian3
The key to defeating a larger opponent is not necessarily the skill of the punch but when the punch is delivered. Remember how the Chinese PUSHED us back to the 38st parallel in the Korea War. China and Russia will not attack us until they are ready-time is on their side. China is no paper tiger.

击败大个子对手的关键，不一定在于出拳的技巧，而在于出拳的时机。还记得中国人在朝鲜战争中是如何把我们推回到38线的吗？在他们准备好之前，中国和俄罗斯是不会攻击我们的——时间是站在他们一边。中国不是纸老虎。

Fred
The mistake Japan made when they attacked Pearl Harbor was to not take out the fuel tank farm. If they had done that, they would have set back the US's response by a year or more. That could have changed things significantly but in the end, they still would have lost. ↑:53 ↓:6

日本偷袭珍珠港时所犯的错误是没有摧毁油罐区。如果他们这么做了，美国的反应可能会推迟一年甚至更久。这本可以改变很多事情，但最终，他们还是会输。

Raymond
My Grandfather was in WWII. When I was growing up in the 70s, I remember him having night terrors when he'd stay over. War, it's a helluva thing. ↑:18 ↓:0

我祖父参加过二战。当我在70年代的时候，我记得他在晚上过夜的时候有夜惊症。战争，是件很糟糕的事情。

Wile E
global wars are a thing of the past - localized conflicts/skirmishes are the future ↑:32 ↓:7

全球战争是过去的事情了，局部冲突 / 小规模冲突才是未来会发生的。