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文章原始标题:The American Dream Is Alive In China


As soon as I walked out of Shanghai’s Pudong International Airport last March, something felt different. But although I braced myself for the unavoidable chaos, it never came. The cities I visited that year—Shanghai, Wuhan, and Xiangyang—were unrecognizably clean. The cars were orderly. Even the people were quieter.


I go to China every year for a few weeks to visit family. In previous trips, I’d been impressed by China’s pace of development. But each year, it was always clear that despite the country’s rapid modernization, China still lagged far behind the U.S.—at least in terms of quality of life.

我每年都会去中国呆几个星期看望家人。在以前来中国的时候,我对中国的发展速度印象深刻。 但是,每年人们都清楚地明白,尽管中国实现了快速的现代化,但中国仍然远远落后于美国,至少在生活质量方面是如此。

As of 2018, this had changed. Far from lagging behind the U.S., I felt that the reverse might even be true: as China cashes out years of economic development into discrete improvements to people’s daily lives, in some ways, life in China is starting to seem better than life in the U.S. No longer as characterized by bad pollution and visible poverty, China of the late 2010s feels clean, modern, and nice.

到了2018年,情况发生了变化。 我觉得非但没有落后于美国,反而可能刚好相反:随着中国把多年的经济发展投入到人们日常生活的改善时,在某些方面,中国的生活似乎开始比美国的生活好起来了,不再贴上污染严重、贫困明显的标签,本世纪20年代初的中国让我感觉干净、现代和美好。

Coverage I’ve read in American discourse focuses on the dystopian side of the Chinese government. Examples abound: from its outright ban of many religious groups, to its increasingly aggressive influence in American political and social life—like the Blizzard and NBA cases over the last week. But over the last five years, this discourse, though often correct, has felt increasingly disconnected from my personal experiences in China and the more fundamental problems at hand. In particular, it fails to comment on the larger, more important context: how much better life has become for many Chinese people, China’s new self-confidence, and America’s struggle with development, optimism, and sovereignty.


China is changing in a deep and visceral way, and it is changing fast , in a way that is almost incomprehensible without seeing it in person. In contrast to America’s stagnation, China’s culture, self-concept, and morale are being transformed at a rapid pace—mostly for the better.


Chinese Growth In The 2010s
In China, the pace of change is on everyone’s mind. Last March, my cousin was marveling to me how quickly items could be delivered to her house: with same-day delivery on clothing ordered from Taobao (the world’s biggest e-commerce website), for example, and with takeout often being delivered within ten minutes of ordering food via smartphone. Meanwhile, my grandpa proudly noted that the government had reduced or eliminated entrance fees to many national parks, and was also in the process of significantly reducing university tuition for students over the next couple of years. My dad, on a drive between Hangzhou and Shanghai, said that the government was planning to test a ban on the production and sale of non-electric cars in certain cities by the early 2020s, as well as figuring out when to institute a more general ban.


I was struck by the pride Chinese people now have in their country. As an American, it felt foreign to me—the sort of thing I’d seen when people talked about going to space in the 1960s, or when they talked about the U.S. before 9/11. In my father’s car, I felt a bit of envy and then nostalgia for something that I experienced only briefly as a child.

中国人民现在对自己国家的自豪感让我感到震惊。 作为一个美国人,这种感觉对我来说很陌生——就像我在20世纪60年代人们谈论进入太空,或者在911事件之前谈论美国时,所体会到的那种感觉。坐在我父亲的车里,我有点嫉妒,然后开始怀念我小时候经历过的一些事情。

When I visited China in the 2000s and early 2010s, there was a general sense that “now is the time to put your head down and work hard to support the economy.” Now, the feeling has become “start learning how to enjoy life and take pride in the results of everyone’s hard work.”


For myself, the changes that were most astonishing between my trip to China in mid-2017, and my subsequent trip just eight months later, were the visible changes in human behavior at scale.


By early 2018, people had almost entirely stopped paying in cash, regardless of whether they were buying designer products at a mall in Shanghai, or vegetables at the local farmer’s market. Instead, they were almost exclusively using Wechat Pay or Alipay on their phones.

到2018年初,人们几乎完全停止了现金支付,不管他们是在上海的商场购买名牌产品,还是在当地的农贸市场买菜。 他们几乎只在手机上使用微信支付或支付宝。

The hordes of dingy private bikes that once clogged the streets were gone, having been almost entirely replaced in some cities with cheerfully colored, app-based bikes that were inexpensive to rent.


People were also much less afraid of petty theft and told me they felt increasingly safe. Why? Well, the government can now often find and retrieve your stolen phone, since it has video cameras monitoring every public—for better or worse.

人们也不再那么害怕小偷小摸,并告诉我他们感到越来越安全。为什么? 好吧,政府现在经常可以找回你被盗的手机了,因为有摄像头监控每一个公共场所——无论好坏。

The changes aren’t just material. I’ve found that Chinese people are also becoming more polite. During last year’s trip, I had the novel experience of waiting in line for the restroom, needing to go out and take a call, and, upon my return, having the person behind me politely ask if I wanted to get back in line in front of her. This was astonishing to me. To put this into context, Chinese people have long been notorious for “chāduì (插队),” or cutting in line. Visiting China growing up, I routinely had the experience of adults rudely pushing me out of the way.

这些变化不仅仅是物质上的。我发现中国人也变得更有礼貌了。在去年的旅行中,我经历了一次新奇的体验:在厕所排队等候,需要出去接一个电话,等我回来的时候,我身后的人礼貌地问我是否愿意排在她前面。这让我感到震惊。为了说明这一点,中国人曾长期以来以“插队”而不受欢迎。 在我成长的过程中,我经常遇到成年人粗鲁地把我推开的情况。

Given recent discord and stagnation in American life, it can be hard to imagine what China feels like right now. In many ways, China in the 2010s reminds me of what I’ve read of America in the 1950s: the country is powerful, economic development is booming, and people are optimistic about the future.


With this new wave of material abundance, people in China are a bit more relaxed. There is a renewed sense of hope and even pride, as people become comfortable re-embracing their Chinese heritage. They are also explicitly encouraged to do so; the Xi Jinping-endorsed “China Dream (中国梦),” for example, seeks to “restore China’s lost national greatness.” The American dream still exists. It’s just in Wuhan now.


China today feels unrecognizable compared to the China of ten years ago.
The China I visited growing up was not a nice place to be. It was dirty, poor, and desperate. I remember walking by peasant women and their children begging for food. I remember seeing wrinkled, exhausted-looking men lugging carts of coal around cities that never saw the sun—gray on gray on gray. I remember how sharply people treated each other, and how terrible it made me feel: how fiercely we had to haggle for things, how rude people were to strangers, and how cutthroat everyone was about their children doing well at gāokǎo, the college entrance exam that still largely seals your fate, unless you’re well-off.


Ten years ago, it was obvious that if you could immigrate to the U.S., you should. That mentality has shifted. One of my cousins characterized the new status quo. When I asked her whether she would consider moving to the U.S., she responded: “Why would I? Life is great here.” She’s not the only one; 20 years ago, almost all Chinese students studying at American universities would stay in the U.S. Now, they almost all go home.

十年前,很明显,如果你能移民到美国,你就应该移民。这种心态已经转变了。我的一个表亲描述了这种新的现状。当我问她是否会考虑移居美国时,她回答说: “我为什么要考虑这个呢? 这里的生活很美好。” 她不是唯一一个这样回答的;20年前,几乎所有在美国大学学习的中国学生都会留在美国,现在,他们几乎都回家了。

Back then, it was unclear how much further the government would push its people to trade off happiness and quality of life for industrialization and the pursuit of national goals. These last few years have been a notable change.
The China of my childhood was a brutal, unforgiving world. Now, a lot of that world has faded into memory.


“The government will take care of it.” This is a major component of China’s success, as well as a common refrain. In contrast with America’s company-driven innovation, in China, the state is the major driver of change.


One of the more striking things about the typical Chinese mentality towards the government, especially compared to the American expectation, is that Chinese people trust their government. A 2017 Ipsos survey of almost 20,000 people reported that 87% of respondents from China believe that the country is heading in the right direction. Compare that to 43% of respondents in the U.S. and an average of 40% among all of the countries surveyed.

中国人对政府的典型心态,尤其是与美国人的期望相比,最引人注目的一点是,中国人信任他们的政府。2017年益普索对近2万人的调查显示,87% 的中国受访者认为中国正朝着正确的方向前进。相比之下,只有43% 的美国受访者和几乎所有国家的平均40%受访者,认为自己国家朝正确的方向。

This roughly matches my experience talking with friends and family in China. With any particular issue China might be facing, the government is either already on it, or people generally expect it to get handled in the near future. So far, the decision has been to consciously steer away from these values and maintain ideological sovereignty, even as China grows in market power and becomes more interconnected with the rest of the world.


Keep in mind China’s recent history: we are only 60 years out from the Great Famine of 1959–61. Many great-grandparents still remember this time, and many older parents and grandparents lived much of their lives with barely enough to eat under the rationing that followed. The hardship that Chinese people endured in the second half of the 20th century produces a great desire for stability and material wealth. It is a country that sharply remembers abject poverty, and is wary about potentially destabilizing political reforms.

请记住中国的近代史: 我们距离1959-61年的大饥荒只过60年了。许多曾祖父母仍然记得这个时候,在随后的配给制下过着几乎吃不饱的生活。中国人民在20世纪下半叶所经历的苦难,产生了对稳定和物质财富的强烈渴望。 这是一个对赤贫,记忆犹新的国家,对潜在的破坏稳定的政治改革保持警惕。

Infrastructurally, the government has been steadily revamping major cities —Beijing for the 2008 Olympics, Shanghai for the Expo 2010, Wuhan for the 2019 Military World Games.
Economically, China reports impressive figures and is the world’s second-largest economy. It continues to run experiments in the form of special economic zones like Shenzhen. China itself is a test of a “state-owned market economy.” hard results speak for themselves in terms of shipping traffic, passenger-miles on high-speed rail, and tons of steel produced and concrete poured.


Furthermore, to deal with severe environmental and pollution problems, “the Chinese government has pledged more than $1 trillion dollars in air, water, and soil cleanup plans, shuttered coal mines throughout the country, capped coal consumption, established a nationwide carbon trading system, poured hundreds of billions of dollars—more than any other country in the world by far—in renewable energy, and promoted the manufacture and sale of electric-vehicles,”


On the technological front, in 2017 the State Council announced a plan to build a domestic AI industry worth 150 billion yuan, such that by 2030, China is “the major artificial intelligence innovation center of the world… [laying] an important foundation for China’s entry into the forefront of the innovative countries and economic powers.” Of course, not all of China’s plans will come to fruition. But many of them have.

在技术方面,2017年,国务院宣布计划建设价值1500亿元的国内人工智能产业,到2030年,中国将成为“世界主要的人工智能创新中心,为中国进入创新型国家和经济强国的前沿奠定重要基础” 当然,并非所有中国的计划都会取得成果。 但是他们中的许多已经做到了。

All of these changes are occurring against the backdrop of China’s 13th five-year plan, which spans from 2016–2020. Among other things, it outlines its plan to:


Support “new urbanization (including “developing harmonious and pleasant cities”) and provide “support for public well-being”
“Intensify ecological conservation and restoration”
“Participate in global economic governance”
And “assume international responsibilities and obligations”
These points make some of the recent changes I witnessed more comprehensible, and explains some of the visible changes in China’s international stance: many of these things were explicitly in their five-year plan.

支持“新型城市化”(包括“发展和谐宜人的城市”) ,提供“公共福利支持”、“加强生态保育及修复”、“参与全球经济治理”和”承担国际责任和义务”
这些计划让我最近目睹的一些变化,更容易理解了,并解释了中国在国际立场上的一些明显变化: 其中许多变化都明确地体现在他们的五年计划中。

The plan, as all of China’s five-year plans have been, seems extremely ambitious. It is easy for us to be skeptical of China’s ability and intentions, and dismiss plans like these as being mostly for PR. But in a unified country with a competent government at the height of its power, mobilizing a population to achieve ambitious, targeted goals is not so out of the question.

正如中国所有的五年计划一样,这个计划似乎极其雄心勃勃。 我们很容易对中国的能力和意图持怀疑态度,认为这些计划主要是为了公关。 但是,在一个统一的国家,政府正处于权力的巅峰,动员人民实现雄心勃勃、有针对性的目标并非不可能。

Impressions And Misconceptions: A Rough Timeline
Growing up in America in the early 2000s, it was distinctly uncool to be Chinese — to the point where I would avoid speaking Mandarin if I could. Americans seemed to have a bad impression of China then as well. Given that China actually wasn’t a nice place at the time, this impression makes sense to me, though it feels increasingly outdated.
If I had to describe American impressions of China over the last 20 years, I would say they went from bad, to better, to bad once more. When I was in elementary school in the early 2000s, China’s image was understandably bad due to China’s pollution, overpopulation, and poverty, as well as high-profile reports of manufacturing controversies like the milk scandal of 2008, or the deadly train accidents.

印象和误解: 一个大概的时间表

The 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics was a turning point that seemed to make a positive impression on American audiences, in part due to its opening ceremony, which involved 14,000 performers. It was unanimously hailed by the press as “the best ever” and “a stunning display of China’s new-found confidence.” This event was one of the first times I saw my parents and local Chinese-American community rally around being Chinese.

2008年北京夏季奥运会是一个转折点,似乎给美国观众留下了积极的印象,部分原因是它的开幕式有14000名表演者参加。它被媒体一致称赞为“有史以来最好的”和“中国的新信心和惊人展示” 这次运动会,是我第一次看到我的父母和当地的华裔社区作为中国人团结在一起。

Since 2008, however, as China has become increasingly powerful, Americans have trended towards thinking of China as bad in a new way. We have increasingly seen China as a threat. This has been exacerbated as China and the U.S. begin to engage in a trade war and contest more aggressively over soft power.


On the other hand, I would characterize the typical Chinese relation to the U.S. in the 1990s and early 2000s as thinking of America as “the best thing ever,” with an unabashed admiration that some Americans found cringe-worthy. Even in 2017, Foreign Policy reported that “China’s Youth Admire America Far More Than We Knew.” Sometime in the mid-2000s or early 2010s, as China developed in a way that started palpably producing quality-of-life upgrades like cleaner air, huge amounts of wealth, and more orderly cities, the unrestrained admiration gave way to a diligent national intention to learn from America where America was superior —and it was recognized that America was still better in many ways.

另一方面,在20世纪90年代和21世纪初期典型的中美关系中,我会认为美国是“有史以来最好的事物” ,带着毫不掩饰的钦佩。早在2017年,《外交政策》就报道称,“中国青年对美国的钦佩程度远超我们的想象。”在2000s或者2010s某个时候,随着中国开始以一种很明显的方式提升生活质量,比如更清洁的空气、巨额财富和更有秩序的城市,这种毫不掩饰的钦佩加深了这个勤奋民族的意愿,即向美国学习,因为美国在很多方面更胜一筹。人们认识到,美国在很多方面仍然更强。

Comparing my experience talking to people in the U.S. to people in China, I’m keenly aware that Chinese people understand us a lot better than we typically understand them. Perhaps this is in part because of historical American preeminence: everyone likes a strong horse.


Perhaps Not A Bad Place To Live
Growing up in the San Francisco Bay Area, I had always imagined myself living and working here. For the last twenty years, Silicon Valley has been the place to be. Many of the most ambitious people I meet in the U.S. and abroad either want to move to the Bay, or are actively planning to do so. There’s a lot here.

我在旧金山湾区长大,一直想象着自己在这里生活和工作。 在过去的20年里,硅谷一直是一个理想的地方。 我在美国和国外遇到的许多最有抱负的人要么想搬到旧金山湾,要么正在积极地计划这么做。这里有很多。

But for the first time last March, I found myself thinking: “I might not mind living in China.” After all, Chinese cities continue to become cleaner and nicer, people’s lives become easier and more convenient, and the government competently handles more and more pressing problems.

但去年3月,我第一次发现自己在思考:“我可能不介意住在中国。” 毕竟,中国的城市继续变得更加清洁和美好,人们的生活变得更加方便,政府能够处理越来越多的紧迫问题。

Meanwhile, San Francisco’s government continues to struggle with worsening homelessness and public disorder. In addition, as I write this piece, millions of people in the Bay are experiencing a multi-day planned blackout. As you might expect, no one is happy about this. My current expectation is that as time goes on, this contrast between the U.S. and China will become more stark.
I’ve since reflected on the idea of living in China. I think that these days, if you’re a normal person living a normal life, or even an ambitious entrepreneur, China is a good place to be. Cities are clean and convenient. Life is exciting and fast-paced. Opportunities are plentiful.

与此同时,旧金山政府仍在与日益恶化的流浪汉和公共秩序混乱做斗争。 此外,在我写这篇文章的时候,海湾地区数百万人正在经历一场计划好几天的停电。正如你所料,没有人对此感到高兴。 我目前的预期是,随着时间的推移,美国和中国之间的这种对比将变得更加鲜明。

I wouldn’t have ever considered this if I hadn’t seen China first-hand. After all, if I’d been relying on the news, I would have mostly encountered Chinese authoritarianism. Western media’s focus on this is understandable. But at the same time, it’s not clear that we understand the factors informing the choices we’ve seen the Chinese government make.

如果我没有亲眼看到中国,我根本不会考虑这个问题。 毕竟,如果我一直依赖西方媒体,我会看到介绍中国的威权主义。西方媒体对此的关注是可以理解的。但与此同时,我们并不清楚我们是否了解中国政府所做选择背后的原因。

For people interested in making an impact on the trajectory of our civilization, there is another reason to be in America right now. China, for better or worse, is solidly on its current track, wherever that will take it. Maybe it will collapse from the pressure America exerts on it, or maybe it will succeed at becoming a stable superpower. Either way, outsiders, myself included, won’t be able to do much to make it better or worse. America, on the other hand, is approaching a crisis of structural and ideological uncertainty. This is something to be worried about, but it also represents a time of opportunity. The right ideas and the right efforts could have a very large effect on America in the coming years.


China is an emerging superpower; we cannot simply avoid it. If we become increasingly unable or unwilling to understand China, we might take a more adversarial stance than is advisable or necessary. We risk escalating hostilities. This is already happening.

中国是一个正在崛起的超级大国,我们不能简单地回避它。如果我们越来越不能或者不愿意理解中国,我们可能会采取一种更具对抗性的姿态。我们要冒着敌意升级的风险。 但这已经在发生了。

There will always be elements of adversariality in any interaction between sovereign powers. As countries pursue growth, there will be conflicts over geopolitical positioning and the exertion of soft power in each other’s spheres of influence. We are far, however, from being able to conclude that more positive interactions with China are not possible.

在主权国家之间的任何互动中,总会有敌视的因素。随着各国追求经济增长,在地缘政治定位和相互影响范围内,软实力的发挥方面将会产生冲突。 然而,我们还远未能得出结论,认为与中国进行更积极的互动是不可能的。

We don’t need to be close friends with China, but we do need to coordinate well enough that we don’t miss or bungle major opportunities to work together on critical problems—climate change, AI risk, and so on.
In an ideal world, we would also take the opportunity to learn from each other.
For all his faults, Henry Kissinger, who negotiated the U.S.–China relationship in the 1970s while serving as Secretary of State, demonstrates what it looks like to be well-informed about China and Chinese elites. In his book On China, Kissinger articulates what the last two thousand years of Chinese history mean for its contemporary worldview, and what that means for our relation to it.

亨利 · 基辛格在20世纪70年代担任美国国务卿期间参与了美中关系的谈判,尽管他有种种缺点,但他展示了对中国和中国精英阶层了如指掌的样子。在他的《论中国》一书中,基辛格阐述了中国过去两千年的历史对当代世界观的意义,以及这对我们与中国的关系意味着什么。

Elite coordination is an important component of elite responsibility. A better understanding of China will require more direct engagement than we’ve been preparing ourselves for. When I was at Stanford, for instance, I was sad to hear that the Bing Overseas Study Program in Beijing was suspended due to low enrollment. In general, people seriously interested in participating in foreign affairs will need to prioritize understanding China and seeing it up close.


What we think about China matters. How we feel about different places and different people changes the way we relate to them. Right now, our unbalanced perception of China is hindering our ability to coordinate effectively with it. Greater mutual understanding would improve coordination, and more functional coordination would yield better results across the board: from environmental, technological, and economic issues, to humanitarian issues and world peace.

我们对中国的看法很重要。 我们对不同的地方和不同的人的感受改变了我们与他们相处的方式。 目前,我们对中国的不平衡认识,正在阻碍我们与中国进行有效协调的能力。更多的相互理解将会改善协调,更多的协调将产生更好的结果:从环境、技术和经济问题,到人道主义问题和世界和平。

If I’m being honest, China’s success scares me. There is something deeply disconcerting about watching China surpass America in the ways it is. China is transforming fishing villages into major industrial cities, while we fail to build high-speed rail or new housing. How are we going to catch up?
But if we’re going to build a good society in America, we have to face these things head-on.
In the U.S., we face an ongoing crisis of governance. We need to understand our own failures, and we need to grapple with unexpected demonstrations of success.